What Happened to the 44,000 Votes Rejected for Signature Mismatch?

What Happened to the 44,000 Votes Rejected for Signature Mismatch?

California rejected nearly 44,000 mail ballots for signature mismatch — but the State does not publicly tell voters what reference signatures those ballots were compared against.

By Christine Bish

Nearly 44,000 ballots disappeared from California’s June 2026 primary count for one stated reason: the voter’s signature did not compare with signatures in the voter record.

That should immediately raise a second question: compared against what?

Was the voter’s ink signature on a mail-ballot envelope compared against a prior ballot envelope? A paper voter-registration form? Or a signature captured years earlier on a plastic DMV pad with a tethered stylus?

California does not publicly provide that breakdown. And without it, voters cannot know how often a ballot was rejected after a paper signature was judged against an electronically captured DMV image.

The State Already Knows Electronic Signatures Can Look Different

A signature written with a pen on paper is not created under the same conditions as one written on an electronic DMV pad. The writing surface is different. The friction is different. The writing angle and available space are different. The image may be scaled, compressed, thickened or blurred after capture.

California’s own signature-verification regulations acknowledge these differences. Election officials are instructed to consider whether a reference signature was created with a stylus or other electronic tool, whether it appears thick or fuzzy, the quality and age of a digitized signature, and whether disability or other circumstances may have affected the voter.

In other words, California already recognizes that the method used to capture a signature can make two genuine signatures look different.

Then 44,000 Ballots Were Rejected

According to California’s 2026 primary rejection data, nearly 44,000 vote-by-mail ballots were ultimately rejected because the signature on the ballot envelope did not compare with signatures in the voter record.

With roughly 8.6 million mail ballots cast, that works out to about 0.51 percent — approximately one signature-mismatch rejection for every 195 mail ballots returned.

That does not prove that 44,000 ballots were rejected because of DMV signatures. We do not know that. California does not publicly separate final mismatch rejections by the source of the reference signature.

That missing measurement is the story.

How the DMV Signature Enters the Election System

1. DMV capture. California requires a digitized signature in connection with the issuance of a driver’s license or identification card.
2. Motor Voter transfer. For qualifying Motor Voter records, the Secretary of State can obtain the DMV signature image for voter-registration purposes.
3. Ballot comparison. When a vote-by-mail ballot is returned, the signature on the identification envelope is compared with signatures associated with the voter record.
4. Challenge and cure. If election officials determine that the signatures do not compare, the voter is notified and given an opportunity to cure the mismatch.
5. Final rejection. If the mismatch is not cured in time or the cure is unsuccessful, the ballot is not counted.

Who Bears the Risk?

The voter does.

If a genuine paper signature does not compare with a reference image that may be old, distorted or electronically captured, the voter must respond to the government’s challenge. If the voter does not see the notice, cannot respond in time, or fails to satisfy the cure process, the ballot is rejected.

That creates an obvious public-policy question: should a citizen bear the risk of losing a lawful vote when the mismatch may partly reflect the government’s own choice of signature medium, equipment, image quality or reference history?

California Should Publish the Missing Numbers

• How many challenged and rejected ballots were compared against a DMV-pad signature?
• How many were compared against a paper registration signature or a prior ballot envelope?
• Are paper-to-DMV comparisons challenged at a higher rate than paper-to-paper comparisons?
• How many ballots were initially challenged, how many were successfully cured, and how many remained rejected?
• Which signature image and date were shown to the reviewer, and were multiple genuine signatures considered?
• Can voters inspect and replace an obsolete or distorted reference signature before an election?

Those are not accusations. They are measurements. California should already have them — and voters should be able to see them.

Five Safeguards California Should Adopt

1. Disclose the transfer. Tell DMV customers plainly that the actual signature image may later be used as an election-verification reference.
2. Do not rely on one electronic image. A ballot should not be rejected solely because it differs from a single electronically captured DMV signature.
3. Compare multiple genuine samples. Prior ballot envelopes and paper registration signatures should be reviewed when available, with appropriate weight given to more recent signatures.
4. Publish the data. Report challenges, cures and final rejections by reference source, capture medium, county and age group.
5. Give voters control. Create a simple pre-election process allowing voters to inspect and update the signature images used to judge their ballots.

The Question Is Simple

Before California rejects a citizen’s ballot, can the state prove that it measured the voter accurately — or did it partly measure the difference between two writing surfaces?

California says its election safeguards are strong. Fine. Then publish the reference-source breakdown. Publish the challenge and cure numbers. Show voters exactly what signatures were used to reject nearly 44,000 mail ballots.

Until then, California is asking the public to trust a system without providing the data necessary to evaluate one of its most consequential judgments: whether a lawful citizen’s vote counted.

EDITOR SOURCE NOTES

California Vehicle Code § 12950.5; California Elections Code §§ 2196, 2264–2266 and 3019; California Secretary of State signature-verification regulations; California New Motor Voter 2025 Annual Report; DMV-SOS Interagency Agreement (2023–2027); NISTIR 8282R1, Forensic Handwriting Examination and Human Factors; California Secretary of State 2026 primary vote-by-mail rejection data.