Comey’s San Bernardino Blind Spot: Visas, Russia, and Farook’s County Job
Fourteen people were murdered and 22 were wounded at a San Bernardino County Department of Public Health Christmas gathering on December 2, 2015. Thirteen of those killed were county employees.
One attacker, Syed Rizwan Farook, was a San Bernardino County employee. Farook attended the holiday gathering with coworkers, left the Inland Regional Center, returned with wife Tashfeen Malik armed with rifles and explosives, and opened fire.
Farook first worked for San Bernardino County as a seasonal employee in 2010. San Bernardino County hired Farook as an Environmental Health Specialist Trainee in January 2012 and made Farook a permanent County employee in 2014.
The public knows when Farook entered County employment. The public does not know which County official hired Farook, which County officials vetted Farook, or what County officials reviewed his hire before approving the job.
After the attack, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, led by Director James Comey, pursued access to Farook’s County-issued iPhone in a national legal battle with Apple. The FBI argued that the locked phone could reveal communications, contacts, location data, deleted material, or evidence from the final weeks before the attack. The FBI ultimately accessed the phone through third-party assistance.
County employment records could identify the official who reviewed Farook’s application, County employees who interviewed Farook, the manager or panel that recommended Farook, and the official who signed the final appointment. The records could also show employment screening, eligibility review, references, background checks, supervisory assignments, workplace concerns, disciplinary history, County-device assignment, employee-relations records, and any warning that required lawful action.
Later reporting based on a Department of Justice Inspector General review indicated that the unlocked iPhone contained work-related information but did not disclose the terrorist plot.
San Bernardino County later hired Critical Preparedness and Response Solutions, known as CPARS Consulting, to conduct an organizational review. San Bernardino County selected CPARS on January 24, 2017.
The CPARS review examined emergency response, employee trauma, staffing recovery, continuity of operations, communications, and financial impact. The CPARS review did not investigate Farook’s hiring, vetting, supervision, promotion, retention, or possible warning signs before the attack.
The CPARS report expressly excluded the perpetrators and events leading to the attack. The CPARS report stated that the report was not intended to find fault or assign blame.
The CPARS report may serve as a recovery report. The CPARS report does not answer whether County hiring procedures were followed, whether County officials identified warning signs, whether County officials ignored relevant information, or whether a connection inside County government was ruled out.
The visa record adds another line of inquiry.
Tashfeen Malik entered the United States on a K-1 fiancé visa after Farook petitioned to bring Malik from Pakistan to the United States. The K-1 file included biographical information, passport and travel records, Saudi visa material, relationship evidence, financial-support documents, and Farook’s statements about employment, income, residence, and the relationship with Malik.
Farook stated in the K-1 petition that Farook had worked as a San Bernardino County environmental-health specialist since January 2012.
The K-1 file is a contemporaneous federal record that should be compared against County personnel files, County payroll, addresses, travel dates, phone records, financial records, and immigration material involving Farook family members and associates. That comparison could identify relevant names, dates, addresses, finances, travel, relationships, and discrepancies.
After the attack, members of Congress questioned whether the visa documentation adequately proved that Farook and Malik met in person, a requirement of the K-1 process. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services said the file contained passport stamps, translated Saudi visa documents, biographical information, and relationship material sufficient for approval.
The Russia-linked immigration connection also requires examination.
Enrique Marquez, Farook’s longtime friend and former neighbor, admitted that Marquez and Farook discussed earlier attacks in 2011 and 2012. Marquez also bought the two rifles used in the San Bernardino attack with Farook’s money. A federal court sentenced Marquez to 20 years in prison in 2020.
Marquez was separately involved in an immigration-fraud scheme with Mariya Chernykh, a Russian citizen. Chernykh was the sister of Tatiana Farook, the wife of Farook’s brother, Syed Raheel Farook. Chernykh admitted making false immigration statements connected to the marriage with Marquez. The FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Force investigated the scheme.
The public record does not show whether FBI investigators compared the Marquez-Chernykh immigration-fraud case with Farook’s County employment records, Malik’s visa-sponsorship documents, Farook household and financial records, or possible contacts inside San Bernardino County government. The public record also does not show whether Director Comey received a briefing connecting the fraud matter, Farook family relationships, Farook’s County job, Malik’s K-1 process, and the FBI inquiry.
Marquez remains a significant surviving witness to Farook’s pre-attack life. FBI investigators should re-interview Marquez about the County official who hired Farook, any County employee who helped Farook obtain or retain the job, any County supervisor or human-resources contact, and any discussion of County access, County devices, County employees, schedules, or County events.
FBI investigators should also ask whether Farook discussed Malik’s visa, the Chernykh marriage arrangement, or immigration records as part of a larger plan, and whether Marquez previously gave the FBI information about Farook’s County employment.
This is a key pattern in mass shootings: well-placed insiders can help gain access or cover up evidence. The unanswered San Bernardino question is whether County employment records, federal visa records, Marquez’s knowledge, and the Russia-linked immigration-fraud network contained information that investigators failed to connect—or information that the County’s after-action report avoided examining.
The public needs the hiring packet, interview records, eligibility documents, background-check records, appointment approvals, supervisory chain, device records, and all relevant personnel materials to determine how Farook came to work for San Bernardino County and whether a preventable warning was missed.